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1 Introduction
Any normative theory of criminal law needs to answer two questions: first, ‘‘what ought to
be criminalized?’’ and second, ‘‘who ought to be held responsible for acting criminally?’’
The first question concerns the proper limits of criminal law; the second one looks at the
contours of criminal responsibility. This article argues that, adequately understood, the
principle of corrective justice can provide a unified answer to both of these questions. The
basic claim behind the principle of corrective justice is that, in order for an action to count
as a crime, there needs to be a plausible normative story about an offender having violated
the interests of a victim in a way that disturbs their relationship as equal persons and a
subsequent story about responding to crime in a way that corrects this disturbance. I will
argue for a specific interpretation of corrective justice, one that requires that crimes consist
in interpersonal violations of those interests that matter for construing the relationship
between the victim and the offender as one between persons viewed as owners of private
goods. More specifically, I will claim that corrective justice is concerned with the pro-
tection of interests that persons have in owning their goods throughout standard interac-
tions with other persons. Since some actions unwarrantedly violate private property in
various ways, they call for criminalization.1
This article is prefatory to an alternative way of thinking about criminal law. Being a
prolegomenon, my account is bound to remain relatively rough, and will therefore be
unable to address all (or even all of the important) implications of justifying criminal law
on a corrective justice basis. For example, I will not provide a full account of what it means
to think about relations between persons as relations between proprietors of private goods.
Nor will I offer a general justification of private property or examine whether corrective
justice can fully capture the condemnatory dimensions of criminal law. These are topics
whose exploration requires a longer treatment than I can offer here.
The article proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2, I offer some methodological considerations
on justification and criminal law. In Sect. 3, I provide a working conception of corrective
justice that highlights the idea of responsibility suitable for understanding corrective
wrongs and properly specifies the substance of these wrongs. In Sect. 4, I examine whe-
ther, thus understood, corrective justice can account for the main cases of crime. I do this
by scrutinizing the offense categories contained in the Model Penal Code (MPC). Finally,
in Sect. 5, I address two general objections. The first concerns the implications corrective
justice has for locating criminal law along the private/public law divide. The second
objection raises the putatively problematic consequences corrective justice has for
understanding the separation between criminal and civil law. Both objections are defea-
sible—or so, at least, I will argue.
2 Justifying Criminal Law
Any justificatory theory of criminal law raises important questions about the choices
involved in specifying both its justificandum and its justificans. On the side of the justif-
icandum, we will have to choose between the set composed of all the existing criminal
1 For an analysis of the connection between corrective justice and private property, see A. Poama, ‘‘A
Distinction with a Difference: Aristotle’s Division of Particular Justice and Its Practical Significance,’’ in E.
Cohen de Lara, R. Brouwer (eds.), Aristotle’s Practical Philosophy: On the Relationship between His Ethics
and Politics (Springer 2017).
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offenses and an adequately specified sub-set belonging to this wider set. On the side of the
justificans, we will have to be able to come up with a plausible story about why any given
principle represents an attractive standpoint for justifying criminal law.
Taking all the existing criminal offenses as the justificandum is problematic for at least
two reasons. First, it supposes that we have a clear picture about the totality of actions,
conducts, and states of affairs that are criminalized at a particular moment. Such a picture
is missing. As Douglas Husak points out in relation to US federal criminal law, ‘‘offenses
are hard to find or enumerate’’ and, given the proliferation of regulatory provisions and
their capacity to trigger criminal sanctions, ‘‘the situation gets worse each month.’’2 The
inability to count—much less to describe—the things that are currently criminalized is not
specific to US federal law, nor is it, for that matter, specific to US criminal law.3
The second problem is that specifying the justificandum in terms of the totality of
legally enforceable offenses rests on an insufficiently moralized view of criminal law. This
is because it supposes that criminalization principles should be able account for all criminal
offenses, even when they result from purely practical requirements (which is arguably the
case with ‘‘proxy crimes’’) or are the products of ideological fads (which was quite clearly
the case during with the legislation that was instrumental to the ‘‘war on drugs’’ policies).
By opening the justificandum to irrelevant or dubious considerations, this all-encompassing
approach potentially invites us to justify the unjustifiable.
But, if the relevant justificandum is less than the totality of criminal law, we need a
method for specifying it. The method I privilege is to look at the results of systematic
attempts to codify the criminal law.4 Codes represent relevant justificanda for at least six
reasons. First, they are based on considerations defended on an explicit normative basis,
not advanced in virtue of legal inertia. Second, codes typically contain provisions that most
criminal justice practitioners consider to be legitimate from a standpoint internal to
criminal law itself. Thus construed, they are meant as an answer to the question of
criminalization and are actually used by practitioners when deciding what the substantive
criminal law is on a particular matter. Third, codes usually point to substantial areas of
agreement on things deemed criminalizable. To put it in Markus Dubber’s terms, ‘‘if there
is such a thing as a common denominator in contemporary American criminal law, it is the
Model Penal Code.’’5 Fourth, given their limited length, codes specify the substance of
criminal law based on principles of normative priority,’ with the most important offense
categories included in the code and the rest left to subsequent legislation. Fifth, given their
systematic nature, codes are comparatively clearer and more coherent than common law,
thus guaranteeing that the chosen criminal law justificandum will satisfy a minimal
rationality test.6 Sixth, and equally importantly, codes are the result of a process of
deliberation that includes several members of the social and professional community, a
factor that plays in favor of their practical relevance.
2 D. Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 10.
3 See also Mireille Delmas-Marty and Robert Badinter’s failed attempt to count the offenses in French
criminal law, in M. Delmas-Marty, Le flou du droit: du code pe´nal aux droits de l’homme (Presses
Universitaires de France, 2004). Similarly, the Committee on Justice quoted by the Criminal Law: A
Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com 177), vol. 1, para. 3.3, p. 12, stated that ‘‘it is now
impossible to ascertain the content of the criminal law at any given time.’’
4 I take Thom Brooks to be attempting something similar in T. Brooks, Punishment (Routledge, 2013),
though I am less attracted than he is to the project of a ‘‘unified theory’’ of criminal law.
5 M. Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal Code (Oxford University Press 2015) 4.
6 This reason appears explicitly in the Commentaries to the UK Draft Criminal Code, 6.
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Though it is relatively easy to specify the relevant criminal law justificandum, choosing
an appropriate justificans is less obvious. This is because different theorists’ considered
judgments about crime are often at odds with each other. Sometimes this is the result of the
professionalization of philosophy. Philosophers and theorists of criminal law are expected
to think in increasingly innovative and challenging ways about their subject-matter, and are
thus sometimes brought to overplay the differences between their views. But sometimes
disagreement is bedrock, with the constant opposition between the retributive and the
utilitarian modes of thinking about justice being a symptom of this difference.
I will not attempt to counterfactually engineer readers’ intuitions about the rationale of
criminal law. Bedrock intuitions are difficult to change, even in cases where one becomes
rationally convinced of their problematic implications at the moral or political level.7
Rather, my objective is to show that, even when my intuitions about the grounds for
criminalizing an action or behavior are not entirely shared, corrective justice will be able to
provide a reasonable candidate for understanding criminal law.
The focus on corrective justice is premised on the idea that, no matter what other
wrongs crimes instantiate, their distinctive (and intuitively available) wrong consists in the
violation committed by an offender in relation to his victim. A crime is something an
offender does to a victim, in a way that disturbs their equal relation and asks for a
correction of the ensuing inequality. This thought will be further developed in the fol-
lowing section.
For the purposes of this section, suffice it to say that my emphasis on corrective justice
is an attempt to articulate a normative vocabulary that will take seriously the offenders’
and the victims’ (defensible) views on criminal law. Articulating the justificans of criminal
law around the relation between victims and offenders intersects with some past philo-
sophical projects—for instance, with Randy Barnett’s restitutionary theory of criminal
justice at the end of the 1970s or Charles Abel and Frank Marsh’s restitution-based account
of punishment during the mid-1980s.8 It also shares Niels Christie’s contention that
criminal law should be designed so that it does not ‘‘steal the conflict’’ between victims and
offenders.9
More generally, my focus on corrective justice is meant as a device for giving normative
credence to a certain kind of complaint advanced by the representatives of victims and
offenders during the last three to four decades in the Anglo-American world and elsewhere.
On the side of the victims, the complaint is that criminal law has unwarrantedly substituted
the state’s interest for the victim’s interests. On the side of the offender, the complaint is
that criminal law has been extended to include actions—for instance, prostitution or
euthanasia—or state of affairs—like drug possession—that should not be criminalized.
When read jointly, these two complaints ground the view that crime should be primarily
about the victim’s interest and that, when there is no victim, there is no stringent reason for
criminalization. Corrective justice tries to ground these two views simultaneously.
Focusing on corrective justice does not mean that other principles might not be at play
in justifying criminal law. I do not argue that corrective justice is the only plausible
7 For lack of space, I will refrain from a critique of retributive and preventive justice as grounds for criminal
law, though such a critique could indirectly (though not conclusively) make my corrective justice justifi-
cation more attractive.
8 R.E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law. (Oxford University Press, 1988); C.F.
Abel, F.H. Marsh, Punishment and Restitution. A Restitutionary Approach to Crime and the Criminal
(Praeger, 1984).
9 N. Christie, ‘‘Conflicts as Property’’ (1977) 17(1) British Journal of Criminology 1–15.
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candidate for thinking about criminalization. In this, I share R.A. Duff’s diagnosis that
there is something reductionist about any ‘‘grand, unitary theory of criminal liability,’’ and
I believe that, given the complexities of criminal law and the plurality of normative
outlooks that come with it, ‘‘such theorizing is doomed to ultimate frustration.’’10
Notwithstanding normative pluralism, I will argue that the principle of corrective justice
should be made salient in the justification of criminal law. This is because corrective
justice offers an adequate principle for most offenses that form the core of criminal law.
There are areas of criminal law—in particular, those covering regulatory offenses—cor-
rective justice will probably not be able to ground without being somewhat stretched, both
conceptually and normatively.11 Whether such stretching will be needed or not, the
argument I will defend concerns only the core (and not the periphery) of criminal law, as
that core is reflected through my code-based specification of the criminal law justifican-
dum.12 But, before arguing that corrective justice can account for the core of crime, we
need to clarify what corrective justice is. This is the task I turn to in the following section.
3 Corrective Justice: A Working Conception
No matter how one construes corrective justice, there is virtual consensus that its under-
lying intuition is that a person who causes wrongful harm to another should correct it.13 In
order for this intuition to be properly grounded, one needs to show that the relevant notion
of wrongful harm is in some sense correctable, i.e., that it can fall under a description that
makes sense of an action (or set of actions) as a mechanism for correcting that wrongful
harm. The same moral intuition requires that we can offer reasons that that harm is
wrongful. Furthermore, it demands that we understand why correcting certain harms is an
obligation most adequately incurred by its author and not by another agent who might be
somehow related to him—say, by the author’s parents or by the state that holds him under
its authority. Any convincing conception of corrective justice is an attempt to make sense
of this intuition by considering how its implications hang together within the same nor-
mative framework.
More specifically, any theory of corrective justice ought to be able to specify three
things: (1) the content of the relations that fall within the scope of corrective justice, (2) the
nature of the relata that give rise to those relations, and (3) the manner (or mode) in which
the relata bring about these relations. Specifying (1) and (2) will delimit the scope of the
harms with which corrective justice deals. Specifying (2) and (3) will tell us why harms are
wrongful and point to the notion of responsibility relevant to corrective justice.
There is more than one strategy for jointly meeting these three specificatory require-
ments. For example, Ernest Weinrib argues that we should think about (1) in terms of
unjust relations of formal inequality between persons, about (2) in terms of persons as
10 R.A. Duff, ‘‘Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law’’ (2002)
6(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 147–148.
11 There are some regulatory offenses for which corrective justice could account, especially cases where we
are dealing with activities that require an increased degree of care.
12 For a discussion about the core-periphery approach to criminal law, see M.N. Berman, ‘‘Punishment and
Justification’’ (2008) 118(2) Ethics 258–290.
13 This intuition is shared by most lay citizens. See G. Mitchell, P.E. Tetlock, ‘‘An Empirical Inquiry into
the Relation of Corrective Justice to Distributive Justice’’ (2006) 3(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
421–466.
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holders of abstract rights, and about (3) in terms of the responsibility one person (the
author) incurs for having violated another person’s (the victim) abstract rights.14 Jules
Coleman adopts a different strategy, whereby (1) is specified as the harmful losses some
agents impose on others, (2) as agents having legitimate interests, and (3) as the causal
responsibility agents have for correcting the losses they have imposed on others, typically
through compensation.15
I will not criticize these two specificatory strategies here. For the purpose of this article,
suffice it to say that, in both cases, thinking about (2) in terms of holders of abstract rights
or legitimate interests is too encompassing, because it renders corrective justice roughly
co-extensive with political morality.16 Another critique is that Coleman’s interpretation
results in a mismatch between the proposal that (2) should be widely construed as holders
of legitimate interests and the parallel requirement that (1) and (3) should nonetheless be
limited to the compensation of harmful losses.17
The point of this second critique is that, in order for the elements of a conception of
corrective justice to hang together coherently, the proper specifications of (1), (2), and (3)
should be kept at the same level of generality. We cannot interpret (2) in terms of holders
of legitimate interests and insist that (1) should be limited to a sub-set of the actual
setbacks imposed on those interests, i.e., to harmful losses. Doing so means that we have
either underspecified (2) or overspecified (1), and ultimately renders one’s interpretation of
corrective justice conceptually bumpy.
In the rest of this section, I will argue for an interpretation of corrective justice that
points to an internal connection running through (1), (2), and (3) and places them at the
same level of generality. For lack of space, I will offer only a working conception of
corrective justice, i.e., one that does not flesh out all the relevant dimensions of my
interpretation of (1), (2), and (3), but offers at least some suggestions as to how the
specification of these three elements could be carried further.
As stated at the beginning of this article, I understand corrective justice as a principle
that deals with actual inequalities that one person (the author) directly imposes on another
(the victim), with both persons construed as rightful holders of certain private goods. When
such inequalities are unjustly imposed, the author incurs an obligation to correct that
inequality. This means that (1) should be interpreted in terms of actual violations of
interests specific persons have in controlling certain private goods, (2) should be under-
stood in terms of persons as rightful owners of those goods—or, in short, as holders of
private property, and (3) should be construed as the responsibility an author has for having
brought about an outcome consisting in the violation of the victim’s interest in controlling
certain goods.
This interpretation of corrective justice might sound stipulative. It is not. The inter-
pretation is not meant as an analytic construct, but rather as a diagnosis for a cluster of
actions tied by similar traits and as a solution for righting the wrongs generated by these
actions. The diagnosis and the solution were first sketched by Aristotle. In what follows, I
14 E. Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012).
15 J. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
16 Saying that Weinrib and Coleman focus only on interpersonal rights and interests is also insufficient,
because, while it tells us something about their modality (i.e., about how those rights and interest are held), it
does not say anything about their substance. Moreover, on an account where all rights and interests are
ultimately interpersonal, a focus on their interpersonal dimension is not doing any specificatory work.
17 Id., 333 ff.
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will provide a brief rational reconstruction for Aristotle’s discussion of corrective justice,
and chart some reasons why my reconstructive interpretation is attractive for us today.
In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics and Book IV of the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle
presents corrective justice as a distinctive principle that ‘‘plays a rectifying part in inter-
actions’’ between persons.18 Corrective justice regulates two kinds of such interactions.
The first kind is voluntary, i.e., it has its origin in a mutually voluntary interaction, and
includes dealings like ‘‘sale, purchase, usury, pledging, lending, depositing, letting.’’19 The
second is involuntary, i.e., it does not depend on an initial voluntary dealing, and it further
subdivides into clandestine and violent interactions. Among the clandestine, Aristotle
includes ‘‘theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false
witness;’’ for the violent, he enumerates ‘‘assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with
violence, mutilation, abuse, insult.’’20
There is a cluster of traits that these interactions share. First, they are all the doings of an
author and, as such, constitute the subject of moral evaluation. Of one of the two persons
involved in any specific interaction, one’s mental states (the author’s) play a central role in
initiating it. In this sense, all these interactions are voluntary from their author’s standpoint.
This is to say that the author’s mental states—whether, as Aristotle indicates later in Book
V, they refer to the author’s deliberate intent, carelessness, or negligence21—are needed to
explain why the interaction took place. For instance, not fulfilling a sales contract is best
explained in terms of (at least) one of the parties deliberately or carelessly refraining from
satisfying one’s contractual obligations. Similarly, a person being insulted can be best
explained in terms of another person’s deliberately, recklessly, or negligently harmful
speech act.
The point about voluntariness is that the interactions falling under the corrective justice
rubric are not aptly described as happenings or general social facts, but as actions per-
formed by specific persons. Unlike happenings or social facts, interactions need authors.
Because it applies only to interactions, corrective justice does not deal with harmful events
tout court. Corrective justice does not cover harms resulting from natural events like
storms or earthquakes. Nor does it, for example, concern the harm that can be incurred by a
person whose life expectancy is lowered by the surrounding social conditions. This is
because neither of these two kinds of events can be plausibly explained in terms of a single
person’s mental states.
The second trait specifying these actions is that they all result in a specific outcome that
can be aptly described as harmful for a person other than the author of the harm. An insult
is an outcome suffered by the insulted, not the insultee. This is to say that, absent a harmful
outcome incurred by a victim, an author’s action, as deliberated or as careless it might
otherwise be, does not fall under the scope of corrective justice. Correctively relevant
interactions need more than authors. They also need actual victims who are harmed as a
direct result of those interactions.
The importance of outcomes for corrective justice has been interpreted in terms of
outcome-responsibility. The expression was introduced and examined by Tony Honore´ and
18 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, 2nd volume (Princeton University Press, 1984)
1130b34–35.
19 Ibidem 1130b37–38.
20 Ibid 1131a9.
21 For an analysis of the correspondence between the modes of responsibility in the MPC and Aristotle’s
conception of voluntary action and blameworthiness, see L. Zaibert, ‘‘A Non-Aretaitc Return to Aristotle’’
(2011) 97(2) Archiv fu¨r Rechts-Und Sozialphilosophie 235–250.
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more recently developed by Stephen Perry.22 The main claim behind the idea of outcome-
responsibility is that the agents whose relevant mental states play a central role in
accounting for the outcome of an interaction incur a special responsibility to correct for the
harm of those outcomes.23
Outcome-responsibility supposes that there is a plausible story to be told about the way
in which the author’s mental state—say, intent or recklessness or negligence—is connected
to and accounts for the result of an interaction. Outcome-responsibility is premised on the
contention that an author’s mental state commits him to answer for his action’s outcomes.
To put it in Perry’s terms, ‘‘the basic idea is that, as a moral agent, I must take respon-
sibility for certain of the outcomes of my actions, simply because they are the outcomes of
my actions.’’24 The possessive pronoun refers to the agent as a holder of particular mental
states—intent, recklessness, negligence, and so on—that are outcome-relevant.
Perry further argues that we should think about outcome-responsibility in terms of
avoidability. For the purposes of my working conception of corrective justice, I will follow
Perry’s proposal in this respect. Avoidability posits that an agent is responsible for a
particular outcome because she had the capacity to foresee it and because she did not take
the steps that she could have taken to avoid it. Foreseeability and avoidability are, on this
conception, individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a person to be
outcome-responsible.
Specifying corrective justice in terms of outcome-responsibility does not imply that
intent or culpability become irrelevant. What it means is that the mental states in virtue of
which a person can be considered outcome-responsible should not be limited to intent, at
least not as long as there are other mental states in terms of which foreseeability and
avoidability can be cashed out. In particular, it means that mental states like recklessness
and negligence are plausible ways of understanding the responsibility that is relevant for
corrective justice. Though different from choice, recklessness and negligence are apt
specifications of mental states whereby an agent can be considered to have brought about a
harm both foreseeably and avoidably. In the case of recklessness, the harm is foreseen and
avoidable. In the case of negligence, the harm is foreseeable and avoidable.25
From a corrective justice standpoint, the difference between choice, recklessness, and
negligence is not a difference between responsibility (for choice) and its absence (in the
case of recklessness and negligence). Rather, it is a difference between different kinds or
modes of outcome-responsibility. In the case of choice, the author can be said to be
responsible because he did not only foresee and avoid harm, but deliberately acted to cause
it. By doing so, the author exerted a kind of control in causing the outcome that is absent
from the instances where he acted recklessly or negligently.
22 T. Honore´, Responsibility and Fault (Hart Publishing, 1999); S. Perry, ‘‘Responsibility for Outcomes,
Risk, and the Law of Torts’’ in G.J. Postema (ed.), Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Cambridge University
Press, 2001). Toward the end of this chapter, Perry explicitly suggests that the idea of outcome-responsi-
bility could be extended to criminal liability.
23 The connection between corrective justice and some form of personal responsibility is generally accepted
as uncontroversial. For a critique of this connection that I will not engage with here, see A. Beever,
‘‘Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law’’ (2008) 28(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
475–500.
24 Perry, supra note 22, idem 80.
25 I will not examine how outcome-responsibility could ground strict liability in criminal law. Suffice it to
say that, following the avoidability conception, outcome-responsibility could account for strict liability only
for practices where extreme care is required. This seems to be consonant with the view the MPC adopts on
strict liability, see MPC: Commentaries, 264.
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A plausible mechanism accounting for these different modes of outcome-responsibility
is the author’s disposition to cause harm. In the case of choice, the author is entirely
committed to causing harm, and invites us to interpret his action in terms of an underlying
disposition to harm his victim and thus act in a correctively unjust manner. When the
author chooses to harm his victim, he does not simply harm her, but harms her because she
is disposed to do so. In the case of recklessness or negligence, his actions can be interpreted
as displaying at least an insufficiently developed disposition to act in ways that are not
harmful for others.
Corrective justice is thus sensitive to the characterological dimension of responsibility.
A person should be held responsible because her actions are in some way reflective of a
relevant component of her character or, in cases where the act might seem out of character,
to allow herself to act in certain ways.26 The reason that mental states matter is that they
inform us about the underlying disposition that person has. A person does not simply
happen to negligently injure another while driving. The same is the case when she injures
another recklessly or deliberately.
When a person acts intentionally, recklessly, or negligently, she tells us something
about her moral character. Corrective justice is only concerned with outcomes that harm
victims, but, once those outcomes occur, it is interested in them as results of the author’s
dispositionally sustained mental states. In order for a person to be outcome-responsible for
a harm, she ‘‘must be in’’ for something, and that something is adequately explained in
terms of her mental states reflecting a moral disposition to act in a specific way. Put
differently, corrective justice is a virtue—that is, a trait of character—a person will possess
to various degrees. We can say that a person is correctively vicious when she deliberately
intends to bring about a corrective harm and that she is not sufficiently correctively
virtuous when she causes that harm recklessly or negligently.
These first two traits restrict the scope of corrective justice to interactions that concern
two persons (the author and the victim) and result in harms for which the author can be
held outcome-responsible in a dispositionally relevant way. But specifying the content of
the victim-offender relations falling under corrective justice and the outcome-responsible
way in which these relations are caused is insufficient. The notion of harm is still left
underspecified. The first two traits do not tell us enough about the kinds of harms that
matter correctively. Most importantly, they do not tell us why these harms are wrong. Take
the example of a (consented) surgical intervention. The patient can be said to be harmed by
the doctor’s scalpel and the doctor can be considered outcome-responsible for the scalpel’s
cut. But this is hardly a paradigmatic instance of a corrective wrong.
We therefore need another trait that explains why the cases we tend to intuitively
include under the rubric of corrective justice are wrongful harms. This wrong-making trait,
I suggest, resides in the fact that corrective harms typically violate the interest the victim
has in the property of a certain number of personal goods. Corrective wrongs target victims
qua owners of their personal goods. One paradigmatic instance of a corrective wrong is
theft. When the offender steals, she wrongly undermines the victim’s interest in the
property of her stolen good. What makes theft wrong is the thief acting in a way that
26 This does not mean that corrective justice is based on an assessment of other dispositions (say, mod-
eration or generosity) that might be part of a person’s character or of that person’s character considered as a
whole. Corrective justice is tied only to the disposition that is relevant for guiding interactions between
persons viewed as owners of private goods, i.e., to the disposition that makes a person morally sensitive to
honoring what is ‘‘mine’’ and ‘‘yours’’ in interpersonal interactions. This specification of the relevant
disposition is in line with Aristotle’s contention that ‘it makes no difference whether a good man has
defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one’, in Aristotle, supra note 18 1131b34–39.
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disregards the victim being the exclusive owner of that particular good. Stealing a good is
both harmful, insofar as it undermines the welfare (potentially) generated by the property
of that good, and wrongful, insofar as it brings about the harm through an action that does
not address the victim qua owner of the good.
Harmful outcomes are wrong because they disturb the relationship between two persons
construed as owners of their private goods. It is clear how that happens in the case of theft,
when we are dealing with goods that are physically external to the victim. But corrective
justice takes this view about victims and offenders as persons equally entitled to private
goods further, and applies it to other instances, such as battery, rape, murder or slander. By
doing so, corrective justice invites us to see a person’s body, sex, life, or name as goods
over which he has special property claims. Corrective justice is the normative regime
whereby persons relate to one other as proprietors having equal claims to their private
goods.
To put it in Aristotle’s terms, ‘‘when one person has been struck and another struck the
blow, or one person has been killed and another did the killing, doing and suffering have
been unequally divided, and the punishment is an attempt to restore the equality by
depriving the wrongdoer of his gain.’’27 Aristotle recognizes that gain and loss might not
be terms ‘‘appropriate to certain cases—e.g., to the person who inflicts a wound—and loss
to the sufferer.’’28 But this is a terminological, not a normative problem, and it leaves
unaffected the fact that, no matter how else we choose to assess the violation of a person’s
interest in her life or body, they are also wrongful because they violate that person’s
property claims.
One might contend that seeing one’s life, body, and sex as goods promotes an out-
landish view. This is a point I will come back to. For now, suffice it to say that the view
gains credence if we think about it in the context of some our pervasive social and
institutional practices. For example, the idea that we are owners of our lives provides a
potent explanation for why we do not consider suicide to be an injustice anymore or, at
least, we do not construe it as a wrong that gives rise to a justice claim.29 Similarly, a
person’s property of her body provides us with a useful criterion for distinguishing between
the wrong of a person being mutilated and a person voluntarily getting a tattoo or actively
contracting for an intervention that somehow affects her bodily integrity.
That being said, construing one’s physical belongings, body, sex, life, or name as
private goods requires a closer analysis than I can provide here. I will therefore rely on
readers’ intuitive endorsement of this view. I will also refrain from examining the prin-
ciples that could further ground our private property claims to certain goods. Nor will I
examine the considerations that come into play in the regulation of the property
arrangements of these goods. This is a task I hope to undertake elsewhere.
My aim in this section was to provide a rough outline for a working conception of
corrective justice. This conception argues that corrective justice should be interpreted as
the normative regime that deals with the interpersonal violations of people’s property
interests in their private goods.
27 Idem 1132a9–15.
28 Idem 1131b.
29 Aristotle considered it to be an injustice because he considered a person’s life to be at least in part the
property of the city.
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4 Corrective Justice and the Model Penal Code
The aim of this section is to examine whether my working conception of corrective justice
accounts for the relevant criminal law justificandum. For reasons indicated in Section I, I
will concentrate on how the corrective justificans fares when applied to the MPC. I will do
this in three steps. First, I will show that corrective justice can account for most offense
categories contained in the MPC. Second, I will contend that what seems like a hard case
for corrective justice—namely, rape—is justifiable as a property offense. Third, I will
argue that corrective justice offers a suitable basis for the justification of inchoate offenses.
4.1 Corrective Justice, Criminal Liability, and Criminal Offenses
Before moving to the analysis of the offense categories contained in the MPC, it is worth
noting that the kind of responsibility relevant for corrective justice—i.e., outcome-re-
sponsibility—offers a unified account for the four main kinds of culpability formalized by
Section 2.02 of the MPC, namely purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. This
constitutes an explanatory advantage corrective justice has over conceptions that construe
choice or intent as the ‘‘essence of criminal liability.’’30 Unlike these accounts, corrective
justice does not take the offender’s choice as the privileged mode of criminal liability.
Instead, it argues that all it takes for establishing criminal liability is outcome-responsi-
bility. This broader understanding of responsibility makes other mental states—like
recklessness and negligence—equally relevant for understanding criminal liability.
With recklessness being the default form of culpability under the MPC—but also under
other similar code projects, such as the UK Draft Criminal Code—taking the normative
emphasis off choice should constitute an explanatory advantage that corrective justice has
over alternative accounts of criminal liability.31
Beyond fit, this de-emphasizing of choice as the essence of criminal liability has at least
another desirable implication. When we take choice as the essence of criminal liability, we
tend to think of offenders acting by choice as ‘‘more criminal’’ than others. For example,
Victor Tadros does this when he describes intentional offenders as ‘‘truly criminal.’’32 But
there is nothing more truly criminal about a person who offends intentionally as compared
to a person who offends recklessly or negligently. Intuitively, a petty thief who acts by
choice is not more truly criminal than a reckless arsonist. Taking choice as the essence of
criminal liability cannot make full sense of this intuition. Construing criminal liability as
outcome-responsibility will not only make sense of the above intuition; it will also allow
for more fine-grained distinctions between different offenses and, within each offense
category, between different degrees of liability.
Establishing criminal liability on an outcome-responsibility basis would take the form
of a two-stage test. First, one would need to prove the presence of a wrongful harm
violating a person’s interest in a private good. Second, one would need to show that that
30 A. Ashworth, ‘‘Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders, and the State’’ (1986) 6(1) Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 98.
31 This is particularly advantageous with recklessness being the default mode of responsibility both in
English law and in the MPC. In A Criminal Law for England and Wales, vol. 1, Report and Draft Criminal
Law Bill (1989), a person is typically considered ‘‘guilty of an offense’’ under a disjunctive condition that
‘‘he intentionally or recklessly causes’’ the material element of crime. This means that, in all these cases,
recklessness is sufficient for establishing criminal liability.
32 V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2007) 84.
Crim Law and Philos (2018) 12:605–623 615
123
wrongful harm was foreseeable and avoidable. Following Perry, harm is foreseeable if the
agent has the cognitive capacity to foresee it. It is avoidable if she has the practical
capacity to avoid it. As indicated in the previous section, the foreseeability and avoidability
requirements are satisfied whenever the agent acts with intent (or, in the language of the
MPC, on purpose or with knowledge), recklessly or negligently. The first stage of this
outcome-responsibility test shows that the offender is responsible for the wrongful harm
incurred by a victim. The second stage shows how she is responsible and selects for the
type of appropriate correction—for instance, (material or symbolic) reparation, compen-
sation for the victim’s involuntarily incurred handicaps and, in the case of murder, mon-
etary compensation and normatively appropriate reparative sanctions owed to the victim’s
family.33
Though they remain quite rough, these considerations suggest that outcome-responsi-
bility offers a plausible way for thinking about criminal liability. In the rest of this sub-
section, I will further show that thinking about crime in terms of violations of property
interests accounts for most of the substantive offense categories contained in the MPC. The
MPC lists 119 offense tokens.34 If my interpretation of corrective wrongs as violations of
interests in private goods makes sense and we accept that, in relation to us, our bodies, sex,
lives, and names should be construed as goods, corrective justice offers an attractive basis
for rethinking the substance of criminal law.
Almost half of the 119 offense tokens listed by the MPC—that is, roughly 45%—fall
under the description of corrective wrongs outlined in the previous section. These include
almost all ‘‘offenses against property,’’ like theft, robbery, burglary, and most offenses
‘‘involving danger to the person,’’ like homicide, assault, reckless endangering, threats,
kidnapping, and so on. To the offenses included in these two broad categories, we can add
a number of offenses that are legally defined as public offenses, but can be normatively
construed as violations of a person’s property interests in the protection of her private
goods. These are offenses like disorderly conduct or false public alarms, both of which can
be considered harmful to a person’s property interest in her body or, more specifically,
mental and physical health. Thinking about these nominally public offenses in terms of
violations of private goods increases the percentage of correctively justifiable crimes to
59%.
We can move next to offenses against public administration, a category that amounts to
approximately 29% of the substance of the MPC (i.e., 35 offense tokens in all). At first
blush, an important number of these offenses—for instance, perjury, tampering with the
witnesses, or obstruction of the law—cannot be adequately construed as violations of a
person’s interest in personal goods.35 But this does not mean that these offenses should be
considered unjustified from a corrective justice standpoint. Though corrective justice might
not be able to directly ground the criminalization of these actions, it offers indirect reasons
for doing so. This is because these offenses might be needed for guaranteeing the stability
and efficiency of a system of public administration without which the protection of our
33 The adequate mode of sanctioning such violent offenses is obviously a central question that any theory of
punishment needs to answer, but, despite its importance, it is not a problem that a theory of criminal law
needs to answer fully, if we restrict that theory to the definition of substantive offenses and the nature of
criminal liability.
34 These are different from offense types (that is, broad offense categories), and they refer to the numer-
ically distinct offenses contained in the MPC. The difference is generated by the fact that one offense type
(like homicide) might have several tokens.
35 Though notice that some others (like retaliation against a witness or informant) can be adequately
justified on a corrective justice basis.
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interests in private goods could find itself seriously undermined. Put differently, these
offenses against public administration could be justified instrumentally, i.e., as means of
guaranteeing that the actual violations of our interests in personal goods are sanctioned
effectively. This instrumentally valuable level of criminalization increases the percentage
of correctively justifiable crimes to 88% of the offenses included in the MPC.
This leaves us with a picture where corrective justice is clearly unable to account for
approximately 11.8% of the offenses falling under the provisions of the MPC. This per-
centage includes some offenses against the family (like bigamy or polygamy), and most of
the offenses related to public decency, like obscenity, prostitution, loitering, or prowling.
Given that the criminalization of the former remains contentious and that, as it has been
argued,36 public decency is hardly a principled consideration for any respectable theory of
criminal law, the inability of corrective justice to account for this sub-set of offenses looks
more like a success than a failure.
4.2 Corrective Justice and the Wrong of Rape
One might object that I have simply taken for granted that almost all offenses that are not
nominally defined as public by the MPC can be interpreted as violations of a person’s
private property. The worry is that thinking about crime in terms of property relations
might be particularly objectionable when it comes to violent offenses or crimes against
persons. The purpose of this sub-section is to defuse three typical objections that might be
raised in connection with a property-centered view of criminal law. I will do this by
considering the case of rape. The underlying assumption is that, if these objections can be
met in relation to rape, they can a fortiori be met in relation to other offenses as well.37
On my account, corrective justice requires that we think about rape in terms of a
property offense and, by way of implication, to construe sex (or, more specifically, sexual
use of one’s body or body parts) as a piece of property. This is not a new argument, and has
been most explicitly defended by Donald Dripps.38 Arguing that sexual use of one’s body
is private property, Dripps proposed that we should remodel the offense of rape by
breaking it into two separate offenses, namely sexual assault (in cases where one’s sexual
cooperation is illegitimately secured through violence) and sexual expropriation (in cases
where the victim refuses, though she is not violently coerced into sexual intercourse).
Dripps contends that there are two types of wrong at work in rape. The first one is the
violation of the ‘‘the interest in freedom from injury.’’39 The second consists in the vio-
lation of ‘‘the interest in exclusive control of one’s body for sexual purposes.’’40 On this
account, sexual assault should be criminalized because it contains both violations, while
sexual expropriation contains only the latter.
Corrective justice is consonant with Dripps’ commodity theory of sexual use. It holds
that certain acts traditionally called rape should be criminalized because they violate our
property interests in physical integrity, our interest in the private control of our sexual
36 J. Mitchell, ‘‘Crimes of Misery and Theories of Punishment’’ (2012) 15(4) New Criminal Law Review
465–510.
37 Another hard case that I will not examine here is homicide.
38 D. Dripps, ‘‘Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference between the Presence of Force and the Absence of
Consent’’ (1992) 92(7) Columbia Law Review 1780–1809. See also G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom
and Equality (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
39 Dripps, idem 1797.
40 Ibidem.
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activity, or both. But, unlike Dripps, I do not think that this commits us to construing rape
as theft. Metaphor aside, a rapist does not steal his victim’s body in the same way the thief
steals his victim’s wallet. The fact that we are physically and psychologically tied to our
bodies in ways we are not tied to our wallets renders the theft analogy misdirected. The
wrong of rape does not consist in taking away the victim’s body or sexual use of her body.
The rapist commits a wrong against his victim’s body (and, typically, the sexual parts of
her body) while both her body and sex remain in the victim’s physical possession. Not so
with theft.
Though I cannot develop it here, a more apt, if entirely unexplored, analogy for con-
struing rape as a property offense would be to connect it to vandalism, not theft. Like
vandalism, rape amounts to a crime that damages, defaces, trespasses, or otherwise alters
one’s property—one’s home or physical belongings in the case of vandalism, one’s body in
the case of rape. Construing rape as vandalism of a person’s body escapes the descriptively
odd implications of the theft analogy.
Whether we think about rape as theft or vandalism, thinking about it as a property
offense is typically resisted on the basis of three objections. In what follows, I will try to
quickly defuse these objections. Note that doing so does not amount to a full defense of the
view that rape is a property offense. However, rejecting them does, more modestly, clear
the ground for such a view. The first objection is metaphysical. It contends that bodies are
constitutive of ourselves as persons and that, consequently, we cannot have a relationship
to our bodies in the way required by property relationships. Following John Gardner’s
formulation, one cannot analogize ‘‘what happens to oneself to what happens to what one
owns, because oneself cannot be an addition to what one owns.’’41 This objection confuses
the practical significance of bodies to personal identity with their metaphysical necessity
for defining it. Moreover, it relies on a highly contentious view of personal identity as
physical or physiological identity. Even if one chooses to ignore its more serious impasses,
one should accept that, given the sheer biological reality of body renewal, such a view
would absurdly imply that, during the same life-time, we are not one but several persons.42
The metaphysical objection can therefore be said to be on metaphysically shaky ground.
The second objection is phenomenological. It argues that seeing sex as property cannot
capture the victim’s first-person experience of rape. The point of this objection is sound,
but misdirected. Though the experience of rape is significant to understanding its wrong,
the objection is misdirected for at least three reasons. First, the experience of rape cannot
by itself constitute the wrong of rape. The moral significance of the experience is not self-
validating but premised on the recognition of an independent wrong to which the victim
reacts.43 Thus, the experience of rape should at best play an evidentiary, not a constitutive,
role in assessing the wrong of rape. If this is the case, experiencing rape will not play a
semantic role in defining the corresponding crime.
Second, the objection fails whenever experiential accounts of rape report feelings of
dispossession. For example, J.M. Bernstein says that victims talk about their rapes in terms
of experiences whereby rapists unwarrantedly appropriate their bodies.44 Though one
41 J. Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford
University Press, 2008) 13.
42 For a critique of this type of conception, see especially D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford
University Press, 1984).
43 Gardner, idem, 3–5.
44 J.M. Bernstein, Torture and Dignity: An Essay on Moral Injury (University of Chicago Press, 2015)
127–128.
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would have to assess whether such pronoun talk is typical or topical, thinking about rape as
a property offense provides a descriptively apt account for at least certain dimensions of
victims’ afflictive experiences.
The third drawback of the phenomenological objection is that predicating the wrong of
rape on its afflictive experience means that we leave out all the cases of unconscious rape.
Insisting on the centrality of experience for defining rape would imply that, if the victim
has no experience of rape—for instance, if she is intoxicated or otherwise insentient—there
are no strong reasons for criminalizing the corresponding acts. This implication should, on
its own, be sufficient for blocking the phenomenological objection.
The third, and final, objection is axiological. It claims that construing bodies and sex as
goods involves an unwarranted devaluation of both. As Dripps argues, this objection
misses the fact that the property view—and, by extension, my corrective justice view—
does not claim that we should treat bodies as consumer goods. Rather, such views argue
that bodies and sexual cooperation should enjoy the protections provided for legal com-
modities. To put it in Dripps’ colorful terms, though law treats ‘‘poems and pets’’ as private
goods, it does not allow us to treat them like ‘‘coffee futures.’’45 Legal commodification
does not as such involve good devaluation. Sometimes, as with poems and pets, it involves
exactly the contrary.46 More generally, the objection ignores the fact that private property
claims are never absolute. The fact that a certain good is private property does not imply
that we can handle it exactly as we please. There are normatively sound limits to the use of
any good, public or private.
My purpose in this sub-section was to weaken some of the worries one might have about
understanding crimes as violations of our private property interests. If there are no sound
objections to envisaging rape (or its legal equivalent) as a property offense, then, given the
higher seriousness of rape in relation to other offenses, there are good reasons to hope that
other (less horrific) actions that we intuitively consider criminalizable can also be inter-
preted as property offenses. The extent to which this view of crime will pass muster
depends on how far we are ready to construe other entities—say, one’s name in the case of
slander or one’s mental wellbeing and discretionary time in the case of non-sexual
harassment—as private goods.47
4.3 Corrective Justice: The Case of Inchoate Offenses
Before considering two more general objections, I want to briefly avert the criticism that
corrective justice cannot justify the criminalization of inchoate offenses. The thought runs
as follows: given that corrective justice is only concerned with actual harms incurred by the
victims and that inchoate offenses fail to produce the harms intended by the offender,
corrective justice cannot account for inchoate offenses. To put the matter technically, the
concern is that a corrective criminal law will be objectivist in an excessively strong sense,
with strong objectivism denoting the position whereby actual harms are definitionally
necessary for criminalization. There are two considerations that stand against this criticism.
First, one can highlight that the MPC takes a generally objectivist standpoint on the
45 D. Dripps, ‘‘More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor
West’’ (1993) 93(6) Columbia Law Review 1469–1470.
46 For an analysis about how granting rights has value-enhancing effects, see A. Harel, Why Law Matters
(Oxford University Press, 2014).
47 For an interpretation of corrective justice as protecting one’s interest in one’s (good) name, see G. Scarre,
‘‘Corrective Justice and Reputation’’ (2006) 3(3) Journal of Moral Philosophy 305–319.
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substance of criminal law. Most crimes are defined in ways that make results typical
components of their definiens. For example, theft is defined as the unlawful taking, con-
trolling, or transferring of a piece of property, trespass as entering or remaining in an
occupied building or built structure, murder as the causing of another’s death, kidnapping
as unlawful restraint of a person, rape as requiring sexual intercourse. Building actual
harmful results into the definiens of most crimes is not specific to the MPC, and can be
found in similar attempts to codify criminal law, such as the UK Draft Criminal Code.
Given its emphasis on outcome-responsibility, the principle of corrective justice is par-
ticularly well placed to account for all offenses that have a results requirement. This should
be an advantage for any theory whose success is measured by its capacity to account for the
main cases forming its subject-matter, not for the cases falling in the penumbra.
The second reason is that corrective justice can be plausibly extended to the traditional
cases of inchoate offenses, namely solicitation, conspiracy, and attempt. The fact that these
crimes do not depend on the actual attainment of their intended results does not make them
offenses without any results at all. Though the exact substance of the actus reus standard
remains a matter for ongoing debate, something needs to be done in order for an action to
be criminalized as an inchoate offense. As Duff underlines, the inclusion of attempts in the
special part of criminal law is indicative of the fact that inchoate liability is paradigmat-
ically predicated ‘‘on the objective character of the defendant’s conduct (on what actually
happens), rather than on its subjective character (on the intentions, beliefs, and practical
attitudes which it displays).’’48 Though inchoate offenses do not wear outcomes on their
definitional sleeves, the actus reus requirement means that they do generate outcomes of
some kind.
These outcomes can be specified in either of the two following ways. One could first
stress that inchoate offenses typically result in psychological harms on the part of victims,
like apprehension or fear. This specification strategy might seem extensionally imperfect,
because some victims never become aware of the offenses that tentatively target them.
However, with victims having the right to be notified of the arrest and, more commonly,
the trial of the defendant, the probability of psychological harm caused by inchoate
offenses remains prevalent.49
The second specificatory strategy overcomes these extensional limits. It emphasizes that
the outcomes needed for criminalizing inchoate offenses are directly harmful to the victim
but not actually experienced by her. The argument of direct non-experiential harms has
been most notably defended by David Hershenov.50 Hershenov argues that a person can be
harmed by an action even if she does not actually experience its harm. Hershenov gives the
example of someone who never discovers the infidelity or suffering of a loved one.51
Another example is the case of a person whose bank account is, unbeknownst to him,
constantly pilfered by someone with secret access to it. Yet another one is the kidnapping
48 R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency & Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law
(Blackwell Publishing, 1990).
49 On victims’ rights, see P.M. Tobolowsky, Crime Victim Rights and Remedies (Carolina Academic Press,
2001). One might worry that recognizing psychological harm opens the door to overcriminalization. This is
not necessarily the case if we set the standard for the kinds of psychological harm that would constitute
corrective wrongs high enough and if, in addition, we are able to design a test that establishes the physical
injury effects of psychological harm. For a more detailed discussion on the latter point, see G.B. Melton
et al., Psychological Evaluations for the Courts. A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers,
3rd ed. (Guilford Press, 2007) 413 ff.
50 D.B. Hershenov, ‘‘Restitution and Revenge’’ (1999) 96(2) Journal of Philosophy 79–94.
51 Idem, 88.
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of a child who does not realize she is being kidnapped. Someone who acknowledges that
these latter two examples can be properly interpreted as cases of harm will also need to
accept the idea of non-experiential harms.
Note that the distinction between experiential and non-experiential harms might also
offer a suitable basis for justifying our commonly held intuitions that inchoate offenses
should be punished less than consummated ones.52 The principled consideration for this
differential treatment is that experiential harms are typically more serious than non-ex-
periential ones.
The aim of this sub-section was to show that there are plausible reasons for thinking that
corrective justice can account for inchoate offenses. A more systematic defense of these
reasons is, of course, needed. But, given the prefatory purpose of this article, a simple
charting of these reasons should be sufficient for making a prima facie case for corrective
justice as a principle of criminal law.
5 Corrective Criminal Law: Two Objections
This last section will briefly try to dispel two more general worries one might raise about
corrective justice as a principle of criminalization. The first worry is that corrective justice
requires that we construe criminal law as private law. The thought runs as follows: because
corrective justice is about the interests of private people, it will be unable to explain the
public nature of criminal procedure or vindicate the claim that criminal law protects state
interests. This claim is unwarranted in both of its claims. First, one cannot merely posit that
criminal law is meant to protect state interests without further argument. Moreover,
arguing that criminal law is essentially public might prove pernicious. This is because it
would ground criminal law in a principle whose vagueness could (and sometimes does) err
toward overcriminalization.53
As Dubber showed, the project of anchoring criminal law in the state’s public interests
has a problematic pedigree. It goes back to the thesis that the function of the criminal law is
to guard the sovereign’s peace qua person distinct from society as a whole. Thus construed,
‘‘an account of crime as an offence against the public peace is not an account of criminal
law: it is an account of criminal police.’’54 Today, some versions of the publicness thesis
rest on a confusion. They amalgamate the assertion that, through the institutions of the
state, members of the public ‘‘take an interest in crime’’ with a view of ‘‘crime directly
violating the public’s interest.’’55 Of these two assertions, the latter is false, because most
crimes are neither committed in public nor serious enough to affect the public’s welfare
considered as a whole. The claim about the public nature of criminal law cannot be
substantively true.
The publicness claim is nonetheless procedurally true. This is to say that the state holds
legitimate control over the application of criminal procedure. Unlike civil law, the victim is
not a full party in the criminal law process. But this is not an institutional fact that is
incompatible with the principle of corrective justice. Though the substance of criminal law
52 P.H. Robinson, J.M. Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law
(Westview Press, 1996).
53 M. Dubber, ‘‘Criminal Law between Public and Private Law’’ in R.A. Duff et al. (eds.), The Boundaries
of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 208.
54 Ibidem.
55 Idem 210–211.
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should be about violations committed by an offender against a specific victim, the public
nature of its procedure can be instrumentally justified. The state is, in virtue of its insti-
tutional resources and presumed impartiality, better placed to enforce justice than any
individual victim can be. There is no straightforward inference that takes us from the thesis
that, because crime is a violation of the victim’s interest, to the claim that the victim should
have full control of the criminal justice process. Even in the case of civil law, there are
procedural constraints grounded in the values of justice or efficiency with which the victim
must comply.
Moreover, recent changes in the structure of criminal procedure express an increasing
concern for victims’ interests. Though victims have been long excluded from the criminal
justice process, they now enjoy a significant amount of procedural rights and safeguards.
For example, victims are entitled to be informed about defendants’ arrests and arraign-
ments, their appeals, releases, or escapes. Furthermore, they have a right to restitution from
offenders, and are sometimes given a say in their probation or parole hearings.56 Given its
focus on the relationship between offender and victim, corrective justice is particularly
well placed for explaining this recent procedural dynamic in criminal law.
The second general objection about corrective justice is that it will erase the distinction
between criminal and civil law. The thought is that, unlike civil law sanctions, criminal
punishment is about harsh treatment, not about compensation. The contention here is that
punishment should be defined in terms of the suffering that is intentionally imposed on the
offender. I have criticized this thesis elsewhere, and will not develop my criticism here.57
Suffice it to say that building suffering into the definiens of legal punishment will tend to
exclude forms of punishment—like compensation orders, reparation, or criminal restitu-
tion—that are primarily about correction, not about affliction.
More generally, this second objection seems to flow from the claim that correction is
reducible to compensation. Since there are other defensible forms of correction—like
reparation, reconciliation meetings, or apology—this claim is false. The emphasis on
punishment as intentionally inflicted suffering, then, is surreptitiously grounded on the
assumption that there is a privileged form of punishment—most likely, imprisonment—
whose afflictive dimension should be present in other criminal sanctions as well. Given that
imprisonment is not the most frequent criminal sanction, this assumption is descriptively
false.58 Also, given the questionable moral record prisons have, the assumption is nor-
matively shaky.
Though it is true that it will bring civil and criminal law normatively closer, corrective
justice does not require that we treat torts or broken contracts as crimes. There is one
important reason for keeping criminal law distinct from other areas of law. Given the
nature and seriousness of the harms typically triggered by crime, the victim is not in a
position to enforce and control criminal procedure. As Tadros argues, there is no deep
principled difference between criminal law, on the one hand, and tort and contract law, on
the other.59 But there are relevant differences between these areas of law, most of which
have to do with the fact that punishment or the state’s more intrusive involvement are not
needed to protect a person against the consequences of a broken contract or accidental
56 Tobolowsky, supra note 49.
57 See supra note 1.
58 Idem.
59 V. Tadros, The Ends of Harm. The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2011)
279.
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injuries. Corrective justice can, for prudential reasons, leave a lot of these practical dif-
ferences in place.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this article was to show that corrective justice is an adequate principle for
grounding criminal law. I focused on the MPC as the justificandum and on the equal private
property claims between victim and offender as the justificans. I also argued that outcome-
responsibility offers a promising platform for construing criminal liability. The structure of
the article remains that of a prolegomenon and, as such, is exploratory rather than
systematic.
There are cases—for instance, some regulatory offenses or victimless crimes—cor-
rective justice cannot justify. Whether these limits are bullets worth biting or not, the
specific limits of corrective justice point to a more general fact about any monist normative
theory. The fact is that there are normative features of certain crimes or criminalizable
actions any single principle of criminal law will be unable to account for. Even so, if a
monist theory like the one provided by corrective justice can account for the main criminal
cases, the fact that it cannot be extended to more liminal ones should not count as a flaw
strong enough to reject the theory. The boundaries to its extension could be better inter-
preted as the justified limits of criminal law.
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